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SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLICY FORMULATION: PROBLEMS
AND CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Irv Berkowitz
Department of Sociology/Anthropology/Social Work
Illinois State University
ABSTRACT
The need for and adoption of certain social policies for the
nation are frequently rationalized by their advocates as being in the
public interest. Often, though, the interest of the many merely dis-
guises the special interests and wants of the few. It is obvious that
the social choices made in the policy process only rarely benefit the
interests of all without being adversely consequential to some. This
paper argues that the problem of social choice in the conflictual pro-
cess of policy making is as much a conceptual dilemma as a practical
political or economic one. A major source of this confusion derives
from the lack of a consensually valid conceptualization of the public
interest-how it is defined, measured, advanced and operationalized in
public policy. An analytical framework is used to define and assess
the nature of the public interest and the conditions which must pre-
vail if any social policy can be said to be in the public interest.
According to Kenneth Arrow (1951), as articulated in his "impos-
sible theorem," it appears impossible to translate the will (or opin-
ion) of the public (masses) into a coherent public policy which is
consistent with the expressed preferences of all individuals constitu-
ting a social aggregate. The technical difficulty in welfare economics
is one of developing a formula for aggregating individual utility
functions with regard to alternative states of society into corres-
ponding collective (social) preferences such that the application of
this formula always yields "determinate" (transitive) social prefer-
ences that satisfy "minimal" and "reasonable" requirements of demo-
cracy. Arrow began his historic work by elucidating his assumptions
regarding individual behavior in decision-making. It becomes eminently
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clear in the following passage that a "rational actor" construction of
classical economic vintage is the assumed model of decision-making.
We assume that there is a basic set of alternatives which
could conceivably be presented to the chooser. These
alternatives are mutually exclusive; they are denoted by
the small letters x, y, z . . . On any given occasion
the chooser has available to him a subset (S) of all pos-
sible alternatives and he is required to choose one out
of this set. . . . It is assumed further that the choice
is made in this way: Before knowing the set (S), the
chooser considers in turn all possible pairs of alterna-
tives, say x and y, and for each such pair he makes one
and only one of three decisions: x is preferred to y, x
is indifferent to y, or y is preferred to x. The deci-
sions made for the different pairs are assumed to be
consistent with each other, so for example, if x is pre-
ferred to y and y to z, then x is preferred to z; simi-
larly, if x is indifferent to y and y to z, then x is
indifferent to z. Having this ordering of all possible
alternatives, the chooser is now confronted with a par-
ticular opportunity set (S). If there is one alterna-
tive in (S) which is preferred to all others in (S), the
chooser selects that one alternative. (p. 12)
The first of Arrow's assumptions, then, is that any two alterna-
tives are comparable. For any pair of alternatives x and y, either x
is preferred to y, or y to x, or the two are indifferent to each other.
This preference or indifference relationship between pairs of alterna-
tives is referred to as the property of "connexity."
l
The property of consistency in the preferences (value judgments)
between different pairs of alternatives may be stated (as the second
assumption) more precisely as follows: if x is preferred or indiffer-
ent to y and y is preferred or indifferent to z, then x must be either
preferred or indifferent to z. Such a "consistent" relationship is
said to be "transitive."
Finally, and perhaps most important, Arrow assumes that the
choice from any environment is determined by the rational "ordering"
of conceivable options in terms of their relative desirability. A
particular configuration of preferences (ordering) constitutes an
expression of the chooser's value structure or system. Thus, if there
is an alternative in the environment that is preferred to every other,
then it is the chosen element.
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The following "reasonable" conditions established by Arrow were
specifically designed to be imposed on the social decision process
(policy making) so as to ensure "rationality" and the "requirements of
democracy." They can be summarized as follows:
Collective Rationality: For any given set of orderings, the social
choice function is derivable from an ordering. (In other words, social
choice has the same structure as that which was assumed in individual
decision-making.)
Pareto Principle: If alternative x is preferred to alternative y by
every single individual according to his ordering, then the social
ordering also ranks x above y. (The term social ordering is derived
from the previous condition of Collective Rationality.)
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The social choice made from
any environmenit depends only on the orderings of individuals with
respect to the alternatives in that environment. (This assumption
recognizes that while a certain number of logically possible options
may exist, that the social choice be based upon those "available" in
the environment.)
Nondictatorship: There is no individual whose preferences are auto-
matically society's preferences independent of the preferences of all
other individuals.
Given the foregoing assumptions and conditions, Arrow illustra-
tes the problem of social choice ("a procedure for passing from a set
of known individual tastes to a pattern of social decision-making")
by invoking the well-known "paradox of voting." He formulates it as
follows:
Suppose there is a community consisting of three voters,
and this community must choose among three alternative
modes of social action. . . . Rational behavior on the
part of the community would mean that the community
orders the three alternatives according to its collec-
tive preferences once for all, and then chooses in any
given case that alternative among those actually avail-
able which stands highest on the list. A natural way of
arriving at the collective preference scale would be to
say that one alternative is preferred to another if a
majority of the community prefer the first alternative
to the second, i.e., would choose the first over the
second if those were the only two alternatives. Let A,
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B, and C be the three alternatives and 1, 2, and 3 the three
individuals. Suppose individual 1 prefers A to B and B to C
(and therefore A to C), individual 2 prefers B to C and C to
A (and therefore B to A), and individual 3 prefers C to A
and A to B (and therefore C to B). Then a majority prefer A
to B and a majority prefer B to C. We may therefore say
that the community prefers A to B and B to C. If the com-
munity is to be regarded as behaving rationally, we are
forced to say that A is preferred to C. But in fact a
majority of the community prefer C to A. So the method just
outlined for passing from individual to collective tastes
fails to satisfy the condition of rationality as we ordin-
arily understand it. (pp. 2-3)
The problem evident here is that each individual has a perfectly
consistent (transitive) set of ordered preferences and yet, the group
(collective) preference, as determined by a majority vote, is inconsis-
tent (intransitive). Thus, Arrow concludes that it is impossible for
a society to take into account the preferences of all its members in
the formulation of its policies.
Most, if not all policy decisions are examples of what has
herein been referred to as problems of "social choice" (desired out-
comes or goals and the preferred means or pathways for their attain-
ment). Value judgments are implied in any given way of making social
choices based on individual utilities. Values, while intangible
things of mind, serve as criteria or guideposts which direct individ-
uals in the selection of appropriate behavioral alternatives in a
given situation. A preference within a policy/planning framework
would be a "value in action" (Kahn, 1969:98). If we accept the fact
that values logically precede the policies which operationalize them
(or attempt to), then we can logically deduce that value considera-
tions (i.e., problems, questions, interests) impinge upon and are
reflected in the process and outcome(s) of policy formulation,
development, implementation, and evaluation. Indeed, as one economic
and social theorist and philosopher of science, Gunnar Myrdal (1958),
has observed-value-neutrality is unattainable, even in the institu-
tion of science:
That a term is value-loaded is, even when used in scientific
inquiry, not itself a ground for objection. It has been a
misguided endeavour in social science for a little more than
a century to seek to make "objective" our main value-loaded
concepts by giving them a "purely scientific" definition,
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supposedly free from any association with political valu-
ations. . . . There is no way of studying social reality
other than from the viewpoint of human ideals. A dis-
interested social science has never existed and, for
logical reasons, cannot exist. The value connotation of
main concepts represents our interest in a matter, gives
direction to our thoughts and significance to our infer-
ences. It poses the questions without which there are
no answers. (p. 1)
"Man is full of wants," said Blaise Pascal (p. 18), "he loves
only those who can satisfy them all." Indeed, economic activity seems
based upon the fundamental assumption that human wants and desires
(values/preferences), in the aggregate are unlimited or insatiable.
Why?
Because once our basic needs are met, we desire variety
in the way they are met-variety in foods, in housing,
in clothing, and in entertainment. Additionally, as we
look around, we see other people enjoying things that
we do not have . . . and we think that our level of
well-being would be higher if we had those things, too.
But most important of all, want-satisfying activity it-
self generates new wants. A new house generates wants
for new furnishings-the old ones look shabby in the
new setting. A college or university education opens
the doors to wants that would never have existed if we
had stayed on the farm or in the machine shop. To be
sure, any one of us can saturate outselves-temporarily,
at least-with any one kind of good or service, but
almost all of us would like to have more than we now
have and better quality in our purchases than we can
now obtain. (Leftwich & Sharp, 1976:8).
Policy-makers and planners are confronted with the age-old
dilemma of not being able to satisfy all the people all the time.
They are faced with a multifarious range of competing values, inter-
ests and demands from a seemingly infinite array of individuals,
groups, agencies, institutions, etc. According to Kahn (1969), "the
value-preference issue is complex because:
a. there are conflicting values at stake;
b. value questions must often be posed in an "as if" form;
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c. it is difficult to clarify just what the prevalent
values or preferences are;
d. values are not always transitive;
e. there is often dispute as to whose choices are rele-
vant or most relevant to the decisions to be made;
f. it is difficult to translate technical issues into
their value consequences in a completely objective
fashion. (p. 106)
Whether social decisions concern welfare policy, manpower policy,
energy policy, tax policy, environmental policy, agriculture, educa-
tion, health, ad-infinitum, it is axiomatic that they will affect the
"interests" of people in a myriad of ways. Only rarely will a policy
decision be beneficial to the interests of all people concerned, or
not be construed as adverse or inimical to the interests of others.
When a unanimity of interests does occur, it is generally maintained
that the particular policy in question should be adopted. In most
instances, however, this consensual validation is lacking and the
condition(s) essential to the application of the Pareto principle men-
tioned earlier does not obtain. Thus, the problem of social choice,
or how to decide which policy balances the benefits (gains or advan-
tages) which accrue to some, against the corresponding detriments
(costs, losses or disadvantages) of others. The posture assumed by
this writer is that the problem of social choice inherent in the
policy making process is as much a conceptual issue as a practical
one related to the construction of the "public interest."
One of the classical statements which addressed the question of
what the public interest is, derived from the nineteenth century
philosopher Jeremy Bentham in his book An Introduction to the Princi-
ples of Morals and Legislation. He avers:
The interest of the community is one of the most general
expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals:
no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it
has a meaning it is this. The community is a fictitious
body composed of the individual persons who are considered
as constituting as it were its members. The interest of
the community then is, what?-the sum of the interests of
the several members who compose it.
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He further exclaims:
It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community,
without understanding what is the interest of the indi-
vidual. A thing is said to promote the interest, or be
for the interest of an individualwhen it tends to aNdU
tothe sum total of his pleasures; or, what comes to
the same thIng, to diminish the sum total of his pains.
(pp. 3, 30)4
An incidental note, worthy of mention here, is the observation made by
the perspicacious French scholar, Tocqueville, in his brilliant and
inimitable study of Democracy in America (1848:175):
Private interest, which always plays the greatest part
in political passions, is there more skillfully concealed
beneath the veil of public interest; sometimes it even
passes unobserved.
An action or measure of government, then, is in the public inter-
est "when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community
is greater than any it has to diminish it." His account of the "com-
munity" interest is, however, particularly germane to the purposes of
this paper.
We shall in these pages attempt to address and contra-distinguish
the following pertinent questions related to the problem of what the
public interest is.3
1. How do we define the public interest?
2. What policies, measures or acts are in the public interest?
3. How do we determine what particular policies, acts or
measures are in the public interest?
4. What is the best policy to adopt?
To this writer, all of the questions above are paramount in any
inquiry regarding social policy and the public interest. Bentham
attempts to provide a way of finding answers to some of these complex
questions in his work. He indicates what the characteristics are of
acts or policies in the public interest-namely that an act, policy or
measure is in the public interest "when the tendency it has to augment
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the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish
it." He further states that we can determine which acts, measures or
policies are in the public interest by determining what is in the
interest of each member of the public (community) and then amalgamat-
ing (by his prescribed functions) these interests.
Notwithstanding the answers to questions 2 through 4, it is
imperative that we have some valid conceptual construction of what the
public interest is, independent of the prescribed methodology for iTs
practical determination.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (n.d.) account of the public interest is
also noteworthy, albiet less lucid and unequivocal. Rousseau strongly
implies that the public interest consists of universally shared pri-
vate interests. We can infer from Rousseau thai something is in the
public interest if the "general will" wills it.i
Today, considerable emphasis is placed on operational definitions
(in response to question #3) to the near total exclusion of answers to
the question "how do we define the public interest?" It seems to this
writer that much of the confusion resides in the failure (perhaps
deliberate) to distinguish between the questions; what policies or acts
are in the public interest? and what is the best thing to do, the best
policy to adopt? and how do we determine what the best thing to do is?
Theoretically, the "public interest" is a critical consideration in
deciding what policy to adopt, because if the interests of the public
are not protected and advanced by government (federal, state, local)
then they may not be sufficiently protected or advanced at all.
I have claimed that it is desirable (if not necessary) to have
an answer to the question, how do we define the public interest?, so
that any proposed answer to the question, what policies or acts are in
the public interest?, can be assessed in terms of adequacy and appro-
priateness. Simply, how are we to know what proposed goal or outcome
is in the public interest if the meaning of the phrase "public inter-
est" remains vacuous? I shall therefore adopt Bentham's definition
that an action of measure of government is in the public interest
"when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is
greater than any it has to diminish it." This raises the problem of
defining what is meant by "the happiness of the community" and/or when
it can be said that a community is happy. This becomes our point of
departure from Bentham. It seems logical to deduce that if a community
is happy, all or part of its membership are happy. Therefore:
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a. a community is happy if all of its members are happy;
b. a community is happy if most of its members are happy
(and none are too unhappy)--,or
c. a community is happy if most of its members are happy
(and not too many are too unhappy).
While the number of conceivable possibilities can be extended,
this is not really necessary. Such things as "most," "too unhappy,"
"too many," etc. are manifestly ambiguous and need not concern us
"too much" (pun intended). Instead, we should say something about
"promoting" the happiness of the community. In this "fictitious body"
which we call society, we are concerned with most people whose quality
of life and ultimately happiness is, to some extent, contingent upon
the efforts of other people. Fundamentally, it would appear that the
happiness of the people would more or less depend on the extent to
which their basic needs are met, and on the equitable apportionment of
benefits and burdens. Anything which ensures or contributes to the
satisfaction of basic needs and/or the just distribution of socio-
economic costs and benefits, can be said to promote the happiness of
the community (public).
In a contemporary statement (or restatement) of the problems
associated with the "public interest," William C. Mitchell (1971)
writes:
. . . the public interest is not some Platonic or abstract
ideal apart from the expressed preferences of individuals.
I may not like what others have chosen; in fact, many
choices that others make in politics, art, wine, style of
life, social science, and the like, are unattractive to me
and I often complain about them to my wife and, on rare
occasions, to the offenders directly. But we should not
deceive ourselves that our personal views are the public
interest. . . . Some scholars have suggested that we aban-
don the term "public interest" and they make a persuasive
case for it-if only to avoid the unfortunate connotations
of the concept. No doubt we will continue to use the term;
the public interest is still worth striving for, but only
if we understand that it is but a summary term for individ-
ual preferences. There is no such thing as public apart
from the people who constitute that aggregate. So under-
stood, the public interest means that one policy is better
than another if it contributes more satisfactions to more
people than its alternatives. (pp. 246-247)
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There is a distinction that we shall now attempt to elucidate
between the interests of the public and something's being in the
interest of the public at any particular time. Things which are a
person's interests are, for example, general ways of enhancing his
opportunities for fulfilling his expectations or aspirations and pro-
moting and protecting his well-being. Acquiring more resources,
power, status, etc. are among the different ways of doing, achieving,
or maintaining these things. When any policy or act is in a person's
interest, it improves (or should) his opportunities in any of these
ways.
Of course, people are different in many ways, including their
expectations and aspirations, and obviously what may be in one per-
son's interest may not be in another's. Consequently, it is argued
here than an account of a person's interest in constructing the pub-
lic interest must be sufficiently abstract to accord with the fact(s)
of pluralistic and intricate values, cognitive and behavioral needs,
capacities, orientations, etc., and diverse publics, to name a few.
These are not, however, the only relevant facts. It can be plausibly
argued that most people have similar wants and expectations, and that
many of the same kinds of things (i.e., money, job, health care, food,
power, etc.) are pertinent to each person's well-being and quality of
life.
Having enough to eat is one of my "interests" in that it is
necessary for protecting and promoting my well-being. Any policy
which ensures that I have enough to eat is in my interest. Indeed,
it is safe to presume that having enough to eat is an interest of
anyone and everyone. What constitutes "enough" would, of course,
vary from person to person, but notwithstanding the manifest differ-
ences in the criteria of sufficiency, every person has as one of their
interests, having enough to eat.
The question I raise now is, whether the fact that something's
being an interest of everyone is a sufficient condition for making it
a public interest. My response to this question is "not quite" or
"not necessarily." I would stretch the criteria further and consider
whether the interest in question might be in danger of not being ade-
quately promoted or protected, if not advanced or protected by govern-
ment. Furthermore, considering the social or public nature of certain
problems and processes (i.e., growing and distributing food) which are
subject to the vagaries of the weather, the market and other economic
and political factors, the interest in question can and must be pro-
tected and promoted by government (federal, state, or local).
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To return to my example, I would argue that if a certain policy
is in the public interest because it will provide enough to eat for
anyone meeting the aforementioned conditions, then no one can purport
that this policy is not in the public interest because he or she
(being rich and well fed or otherwise protected from threat of starva-
tion) will not directly benefit from it.
Another issue worth noting is the distinction between interest,
better interest and best interest as they apply to social policy and
the public interest. The fact that a certain policy is in the public
interest is not the determinant of whether it is, will be, or should
be adopted. Another policy may be in the better interest of the pub-
lic. A guaranteed annual income policy granting a basic benefit of
$3000 may very well be in the public interest, but a policy alterna-
tive favoring a grant of $4000 may be more in the public interest.
Likewise, some policy may be in the public interest (i.e., strict pol-
lution control standards and deadlines), but may not be in the best
interest of the public (threats of immediate and long term socio-
economic ramifications-inflation, unemployment, etc.). Indeed, as
Jonathan R. T. Hughes (1977) pointed out, The Governmental Habit of
intervention (i.e., monetary or regulatoryT under the aegis of the
public interest, has invariably given rise to governmental control
and bureaucracy. In some cases, however, the question is Who regu-
lates who in whose interest?
A continuing dilemma of regulatory agencies is that they
can become vehicles whereby the regulated regulate the
regulators in the interest of the regulated, rather than
that of the public. (Hughes, 1977:102)
In summary, this writer has argued that something is a public
interest if it is an interest of anyone who is a member of the public;
that is, if it is necessary for the protection and/or enhancement of
anyone's welfare. A further stipulation, however, was that in such
instances the means for one's own protection or improvement was beyond
the scope or capability of the individual members of the public, such
that it is likely to be achieved, performed, or maintained only by
government.
Footnotes
1. As enunciated by Arrow, each alternative in a theory of consumer
choice is a "commodity bundle." Rational choice is contingent
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upon pairwise comparisons. Consequently, in the firm each alterna-
tive consists in a particular configuration of inputs and outputs;
in welfare economics, each alternative represents a "distribution
of commodities and labor requirements; in the political market-
place of electoral choice, we can define voting (including the out-
come) as the collective exercise of choice among a range of alter-
natives (i.e., candidates) which presumably is a device for achiev-
ing a selection of a particular set(s) of policies.
2. These excerpts were taken from Alfred N. Page (ed.) (1968) Utility
Theory: A Book of Readings. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
3. Virginia Held, in her book, The Public Interest and Individual
Interests (New York, 1970), pp. 12-13, gives a list of eight ques-
tions which overlap those given here.
4. See Chapters III-V, Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New
York: Hafner Press, 1975).
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